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ABSTRACT

Discriminant analysis and neural network methodologies were applied to the problem of identifying
illegal sales transactions. The researchers independently developed models using data provided by a
cr^it card company. A series of measures were developed and used to construct the models. The final
results were that the discriminant analysis model recognized 32.3% of the fraudulent activity, while the
neural network approach found 28.9%. With only 11.6% of the transactions in common, the combination
of the two models identified 49.6%i. In order to provide a real time monitoring program, the models were
simplified yielding a capture rate of approximately 42%.
INTRODUCTION
The project for a major credit card encompassed two efforts to detect fraudulent patterns of cardholder's purchasing
activity. The central focus of the investigation evaluated the use of statistical and neural network techniques. The
final results are reported in this paper without disclosing specific details that would assist criminals in evading
detection. This is consistent with other research that restricted the availability of data and censored results in their
reports (e.g., Leonard, 1993).
Credit eard operations expose the lending institution to two primary types of risk, credit and fraud. All
circumstances where a cardholder or merchant become indebted to a bank without deception and is unable or
unwilling to repay are classified as credit losses. All other situations are classified as fi-aud. Fraud is a crime
although there are variations in its definition among the statutes of various countries where the credit card is used.
Fraud includes the following categories: lost, stolen, not received, counterfeit, fraudulent application, fraudulent use
of card, and other (Bolton and Hand, 2002). This study focuses on the fraudulent use of a stolen card or account
number. In this situation, the thief spends as much as possible in as short a time as possible, before the theft is
detected and the credit card is stopped. Therefore, the credit card company needs to detect the theft early to prevent
large losses. For example, at the start of the study, the current detection methodology required that one hundred
calls be made to cardholders for each stolen card detected. At a cost of $ 15 per call, the total cost to identify a fraud
account is $1,500 which is equal the average loss saved by stopping the card. Management wanted earlier detection
to reduce of the number of calls to identify each fraudulent card and an increase the amount saved by quicker action.
Specifically, the objectives of the project were to develop quantitative approaches to risk pattern analysis for use in
real time processing and to develop procedures that significantly increase the bank's ability to identify and control
risky transaction patterns. For the credit card industry, fraud accounts for over $850 million dollars in losses each
year in the United States (Ghosh and Reilly, 1994) and $10 billion worldwide (Alerkerov, Freislebent and Rao,
1997). Although fraud losses are high in absolute dollars, they are only a small proportion of total activity. Thus, the
problem of risk pattern recognition can be characterized as looking for a small number of needles in an enormously
large haystack. 'These nonstandard transactions are identified as outliers that are detected by a number of different
tests (Bamett and Lewis, 1994; Yu, Qian, Lu, and Zhou, 2006). Fraud is almost always directed toward cash or
items that can be converted into cash and compressed in time. Thus, over time, the pattern of fraud use should
diverge from legitimate use in recognizable ways.
The data used in this study include actual transactions organized by account over a six month period. Fraudulent
transactions are identified. For example, a thief verifies that a stolen credit card is active by purchasing gasoline at a
safe, automatic pump before going to a store (Provost, 2002). This allows us to segment the accounts into good and
fraudulent transactions defined as those that had one or more fraudulent transactions. Over ten million transactions
were used in the analysis.
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RESEARCH ACTIVITIES
The research is directed at developing a methodology for identifying fraudulent transactions using a standardized
scale to measure the probability that a given transaction is suspicious. The project plan includes the following steps:
(1) develop measures, (2) select transactions for analysis, (3) use statistical techniques to develop models, (4)
evaluate the accuracy of the models, and (5) implement the models for online process detection.
Measures
The final accuracy of the model depends on the measures or variables used to identify patterns in the sequence of
transactions for each account. This is the creative step where all possible measures are generated. The initial
measures are the source data for each transaction, i.e., the transaction amount. Next a series of measures are derived
using the source measures, i.e., the change between consecutive transaction amounts. To gain a further prospective
over time, moving averages are computed for the appropriate measures and become the basis for the final set of
twenty-four measures.
Each of the source measures provides information on the current transaction, while the derived measures supply
additional knowledge over a period of time. The change in consecutive purchase amounts involves the prior
transaction and its relationship to the current transaction. The high-low range covers a longer time horizon that uses
the last six transactions in its computation. To increase the efTectiveness in determining pattems over time, the
moving average technique is employed.
A short term moving average, usually three to six transactions, reflects the current movement of the measure and
adjusts the current value by smoothing it with the last several transactions. A long term moving average, usually
greater than ten transactions, indicates the overall trend of the account. These averages give a time dimension to
each individual transaction.
A moving average analysis determined the number of transactions to apply to each measure. This resulted in
selecting the moving averages presented in Table 1. Thus, the total number of measures used in the model
development phase included the twenty-four sources and derived measures with their long term and short term
moving averages. These sixty-one measmes were computed for all transactions used in the analysis, both good
accounts and fraudulent accounts, and were added to each transaction in the file that contained merchant
information (e.g., type of vendor, location, etc.).
Measure
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Movins Averages
Long
Short
5
15
6
20
3
20
3
15
NA
NA
3
15
3
15
3
20

Measure
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Moving Averages
Short
Long
4
15
NA
NA
3
15
5
20
3
15
3
15
NA
NA
3
15

Measure
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Moving Averages
Short
Long
3
15
6
20
NA
NA
NA
NA
5
15
NA
NA
4
18
25
7

NA=Not Applicable
Table 1: Moving Averages Selected for Each Measure

Model Development Process
The development of the model involved three sets of transactions. To simplify this description, a fraudulent
transaction is referred to as a fraud transaction, and any transaction that is not identified as fraudulent is designated
a good transaction. There is a possibility that a credit card transaction may be unobserved as fraudulent and thus be
labeled as a good transaction. Research has addressed misclassification of training samples (Lacherbmch, 1966,
1974; Chhikara and Mckeon, 1984), but not in the context of fraud detection. Issues such as these were discussed in
Chan and Stolfo (1998) and Provost and Eawcett (2001). The first group is composed of the fraud transactions that
are randomly selected from the pool of all fraud transactions. Next, two good transactions were matched with each
fraud transaction. The matching is done based on the amount and the type of purchase. The final group was
composed of a random selection of good transactions.
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Statistical Techniques
The process of developing the model to discriminate betvi'een normal accotint activity and fraudulent transactions
involves five statistical procedures: (1) normality test, (2) T-test, (3) factor analysis, (4) stepwise discriminant
analysis, and (5) discriminant analysis. Each of these techniques is discussed as it relates to the model development
in identifying fraudulent activity.
A basic assumption is that the transaction amounts are normally distributed. The issue of normality was examined
with plots of the purchase amount for sample accounts. The frequency charts illustrated that the measures do not
have a norm al shape and therefore are not normally distributed. The Shapiro-Wilks Normality Test (Sail, Creighton,
and Lehman, 2005) used with less than 2,000 transactions was applied to formally determine if the measure was
noimally distributed. The results of this analysis clearly indicated that it was not a normal distribution. Using the
621,787 transactions from the good accounts, the KSL Normality Test (Sail, Creighton, and Lehman, 2005) is used
with greater than 2,000 transactions and was applied to the transaction amounts with the same result.
Judicious use of transformations extends the range of applications in which normal sampling theory is appropriate.
Transformations improve the normal approximation of many other distributions. The first step is to determine if an
appropriate transformation exists to normalize the measure. After a review of potential distributions (Srivastatm,
2002) and the graphs of the actual data, the logarithm and the square root were applied to the transaction amotmt.
The natural logarithm resulted in normalizing the transaction amount.
The T-test provides a statistical overview of the measures for both fraudulent and good transactions (Sail,
Creighton, and Lehman, 2005). A by-product of this test procedure is the computation of the mean, standard
deviation, standard error, minimum value, and maximum value. These statistics are used to validate the values for
all measures and identify errors in the database. After correcting the errors, the T-test uses the mean and standard
deviation for each group of transactions (fraudulent and good) to test the hypothesis that the population means are
the same. The results of the T-test showed that the averages for all measures are significantly different between the
good and fraudulent transactions. Thus, each measure has some degree of ability to discriminate between the good
and fraudulent activity.
Factor analysis is an interdependence analysis used to determine the relationships among the different measures
(McLachlan, 2005). The sixty-one measures created from the transaction data were derived to expand the original
soiffce infoimation. In this analysis, the latent constructs underlying the measures are investigated. This yields
insight into the different relationships that are really being monitored and identifies redundancies among measures.
The factor analysis resulted in twenty-four distinct groups, which reflect different aspects of purchase behavior.
This suggests that a large number of measures are required to discriminate between good and fraudulent
transactions. A sample of the logical groupings of the measures with their correlation values is given in Table 2.
Factor Analysis Group 1
SM
88
11
SM
4
87
LM
85
3
SM
82
1
79
4
LM
SM
75
3
Note:

SM
LM
Act

Factor Analysis Group 3
12
LM
82
SM
80
12
18
SM
76
18
LM
75

Factor Analysis Group 6
11
SM
88
18
LM
86

Short Term Moving Average
Measure used in Final Model
Long Term Moving Average
Indicated by Italics
Actual Value of Measure
Figure 2: Partial List of Groups from the Factor Analysis

This information is useful in selecting a substitute measure that is easier to compute for the operational model. For
example, the best measure to use in Group 1 is Measure IPs short term moving average. If Measure 11 is too
difficult to calculate. Measure 4 that requires no calculations or prior transaction information is a potential substitute
for it. As new measures were developed, this analysis also showed whether a new concept was unique or a variation
of one in use.
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Stepwise discriminant analysis techniques are designed to determine a good set of measures to use in identifying
whether a transaction in fraudulent or not. The stepwise discriminant procedure (Jackson, 1991; Cooley and Lohnes,
1986) is a sequential process where the algorithm builds a model one measure at a time. Using forward recursion
technique, the model initially has no measures and chooses the single most discriminating measure. On each
succeeding step, the procedure selects the most discriminating measure from those remaining that add significantly
to the model. The sequential nature of this process does not consider the effect of the simultaneous interaction from
several measures. This provides the analyst with an extensive list of measures ranked in descending order from the
most important to be investigated to the least. This information combined with the results from the factor analysis
and T-test is utilized in developing the final discriminant models.
The discriminant analysis procedure requires that the analyst specify the exact set of measures to be used. The
objective of the discriminant analysis process is to classify individual transactions using a set of independent
measures, into one of two mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. For example, on the basis of the Amount
and High-Low Range over the last six transactions, the analyst wants to classify a transaction as either likely or
unlikely to be fraudulent. This discussion is limited to two variables. It is expanded to more measures for the
complete model.
The information presented in this example is hypothetical. Based on historical data, the analyst established the alert
levels, the value above which the accotmt's transaction is suspected of being fraudulent, at $325 for the purchase
amoimt and $310 for the High Low Range. The 24th purchase was for $312 and increased the range to $298.
Neither value considered individually exceeded the alert level and required no further action.
The discriminant analysis procedure displays this simation using both measures in a two dimensional view of the
historical information. Figure 3 presents ten transactions that were classified as fraud, labeled with an F, and
twenty-five Gs identifying good transactions. Assuming that the individual alert levels are $325 on the purchase
Amount and $310 on High-Low Range, the five fraud transactions in the shaded area appear on the analyst list for
review. The other five fraud transactions in the white area were not identified for review, because they were below
the alert value. Only three good transactions were incorrectly identified as fraudulent.
The discriminant procediue determines an equation or function, represented by a Classification Line, and separates
the two sets; one dominated by fraud, the other by good transactions. In Figure 3, the line is positioned to separate
the two groups with the fewest misclassifications as possible. Thus, if the line were moved down to correctly
classify the F with the lowest value, then three good transactions would be incorrectly grouped. Similarly, three
additional fraudulent ones would be missed if the line were moved upward to eliminate the misclassification of the
two good transactions. Notice that two good transactions previously examined are now below the Line and ignored.
With the Classification Line optimally placed based on historical information, the real power of this technique is
that it provides the analyst with a single value that combines all the measiu-es into one based on an equation that
more accurately identifies fraud.
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Figure 3: Discriminant Analysis Model Development
The discriminant function is then applied to the current transaction. For example, with the alert level for the
individual measures at $325 and $310, the 24th purchase does not exceed either alert level and no action is taken
(Figure 4). However, the Discriminant Function evaluates the interaction of the two measures and determines that
the 24th transaction is above the Classification Line in the new Combination Alerts area. Therefore, it is categorized
as suspicious. In addition, the probability of a fraudulent transaction assigns standard scale to the degree of
suspicion. ViTien the probability is greater than .500, it is called a fraudulent transaction.
The model computes the probability of fraud, classifies each transaction and identifies whether the discriminant
function was correct. Figure 5 summarizes this information in the confusion matrix. The two distributions at the top
of Figure 5 illustrate the two types of errors that are encountered in positioning the Classification Line: (1) good
transactions that were classified as fraud, referred to as false positives, and (2) misclassified fraud transactions. The
focus of the study is to capture as much of the fraud as possible, while not bothering too many cardholders who are
using their cards legitimately. These are presented in the two shaded boxes.
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Figure 5: Confusion Matrix Development
Initially, all sixty-one variables were submitted with the complete analjdic file and used in creating a baseline
model. This model is an estimate of the performance that is possible with the final model. In reporting results for the
segmentation analysis, the percentage of correctly classified fraud and false positives is given. The baseline model
resulted in 4% false positives and 85% fraudulent transactions correctly identified. If the data is to be segmented,
the subgroups must produce better results.
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Two possible methods for segmenting required investigation. One method for separating the data was based on the
dollar amount of the transaction, while the second used the sequence number. After examining the data, the logical
values to segment using purchase amount were $26 and $120. When compared to the baseline, only a minor
improvement is gained by segmentation on transactions by value.
The second method for separating the data is by the sequence number. With all of the short term moving averages
fully calculated by the sixth transaction, this creates a logical separation point for segmentation. Additional points
for segmentation are when the long term moving averages are calculated at the 15th and 20th transactions. All
combinations of the segmentation using these points were examined. The best solution increases the effectiveness in
identifying good transactions by 1% and fraudulent transactions by 6%. The data is segmented into three groups.
Low Number of Transactions
Medium Number of Transactions
High Number of Transactions

Transaction Sequence Numbers between 2 and 6
Transaction Sequence Numbers between 7 and 19
Transaction Sequence Numbers greater than 19

Ten of the original source and derived measures are required to achieve the best models for discriminating between
transactions. The most important measure is Nitmber 7. Measures 1, 3, 7 and 10 are related to velocity, the number
of transactions in a period of time, while measures 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 represent volatility, the change in transaction
amounts. Concentration of purchases is given in measure 2. The final model combined two measures each of from
velocity and volatility with the concentration variable.

RESULTS OF THE STUDY
The discriminate process constmcts an equation that optimally divides the transactions in two groups and generates
a probability that a given transaction is fraudulent. When the probability is greater than .500, it is classified a
fraudulent transaction. However, the line that separates the two groups can be moved to a higher level than .50.
Figme 6 illustrates the parallel Classification Lines generated for probabilities of .60 and .70. As the fraud
probability is increased, the percentage of fraudulent transactions correctly identified and the number of good
transactions falsely classified as fraudulent are reduced. The results of these different classification models are
present in a confusion matrix. This is illustrated in Figure 7. The false positives are reduced from 8% as .50 to 4% at
.60 and to 0% at .70, while a more dramatic decrease takes place in identifying the fraud as the probability
increases.
The discriminant model development file provides an estimate of the effectiveness of each model. Figure 8
illustrates the impact from moving the fraudulent probability (Classification Level) higher. For each model, the "%
Good" indicates the percentage of non-fraudulent transactions that are examined (false positives), and the "%
Fraud" represents the percentage of correctly identified fraudulent transactions. For example, at .50 classification
probability, 1.69% of good transactions are reviewed in order to capture 85.33% of the fraudulent ones. The number
of false positives decreases as the classification value increases. Unfortunately, the number of fraudulent
transactions also decreases. Thus, when the classification value increases to .55, the false positives decrease by
.13% (1.69% - 1.56%), while the fraud captured decreases by 2.99% (85.33% - 82.34%). This tradeoff is given for
each Classification Level in each of the three models. It is management's decision at what level to set the probability
of classifying a transaction as fraudulent based on the tables.
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Actual
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Figure 7: Different Classification Levels - Confusion Matrix
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Classification
Level
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95

Low # of Transactions
% Fraud
% Good
1.69%
85.33%
82.34%
1.56%
80.43%
1.36%
79.08%
1.23%
77.72%
1.10%
74.46%
0.91%
72.55%
0.65%
71.20%
0.32%
67.39%
0.19%
61.41%
0.13%

Number of Transactions:
1539
Good
Fraud

Richardson

Medium # of Transactions
% Fraud
% Good
7.79%
81.31%
78.93%
6.66%
74.64%
5.52%
70.71%
4.30%
3.40%
67.38%
63.69%
2.31%
1.89%
58.33%
52.26%
1.37%
44.88%
0.85%
35.95%
0.52%

High # of Transactions
% Fraud
% Good
95.15%
3.02%
94.14%
2.41%
93.14%
2.04%
91.62%
1.58%
90.43%
1.11%
0.79%
88.66%
86.96%
0.42%
83.69%
0.28%
78.65%
0.28%
0.09%
68.01%
2154

2118

1588

840

368

Figure 8: Results from the Discriminant Models
The discriminant function was set at a level where ten good transactions are misclassified for each fraudulent
transaction identified. This results in capturing 32.3% of the fraudulent transactions and 30.4% of the fraudulent
dollars.
The neural network model with two layers was developed using the five variables from the discriminant model with
an additional 17 from the 61 original measures defined for the project and testing them with five million
transactions. In tests (Figure 9) with another five million transactions, they were able to capture 28.9% of the
fraudulent tiransactions and 27.8% of the dollars at a 10 to 1 ratio. Research continues to explain the difference in
accounts identified between the two approaches.
Discriminant Analysis
Neural Network
Combined

Number of Transactions
32.3%
28.9%
49.6%

Value in Dollars
30.4%
27.8%
46.1%

Figure 9: Final Summary
From the user's perspective, management prefers a model that is comprehensible. For many analysts, the
discriminant model is easier to interpret than a neural network model. The measures that apply to a particular case
may guide the subsequent investigation and prosecution. However, the immediate goal is to stop all fraudulent use
of the card before the limit is exceeded. In order to provide a real time monitoring program, the models were
simplified yielding a capture rate of approximately 42%.
CONCLUSION
The initial review of the transaction information in date order disclosed that 80% of the first purchases with the card
were for gasoline at a safe, automatic pump. In many cases, several gas purchases were made within a few hours. It
was assumed that the thief had friends fill their gas tanks using the card. This led to a velocity check rule to caU the
account owner if more than two gasoline transactions occurred within a specified number of hours.
A number of accounts produced a very high value on the suspicion rating during the testing phase, but when the
owners were called, the cards were not stolen. These accounts were reviewed later to leam that the owners had filed
for bankruptcy after exceeding the maximum limit on the card. The profile of theft and bankruptcy was the same for
both types of fraudulent activity.
The number of calls to identify a fraudulent account was reduced to eight. The value of the call service is now
justified since it cost $120 to reduce the loss of fraudulent transaction by $1,500 or more. The system is designed to
stop the card if the suspicion score is high and allow the owner to call the company if the purchase it denied. A
suitable compromise was established between stopping the card and calling account owner.
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In this application, the speed of processing is of the essence. This is the case in credit card transaction processing
where a high number of purchases are completed each day. Operationally, the discriminant model was modified to
use measures that required the least amount of processing of prior transactions. The moving averages were changed
to exponential smoothing equations to simplify the calculations. Similar modifications were made to the neural
network model. These modifications are similar to those made by HNC Software as stated in their patent
(Gopinathan, Biafore, Ferguson, Lazarus, Pathria and Jost, 1998). The company initially started the process to
patent the models, but after the legal department described the amount of details that are required, the patent was not
filed. There are over 80 patents that have been filed for fraud detection models (Provost, 2002). All models are
constantly updated and modified to reflect the changing pattems of criminal behavior.
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